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Factors Influencing Farmers’
Selection of a Milk Handler
Richard L. Kilmer, Jonq-Ying Lee and Dale Carley’
Abswact
A structural probit model is estimated to determine the change in the probability of
selecting a milk handler. Cooperatives are thought to have lower prices and higher deductions than
independent milk handlers and these Factors reduce the probability that a farmer will select a
cooperative by 0.39 and 0.32. Cooperatives are thought to have better services and an assured
market and payment than independent milk handlers and these factors increase the probability that
a farmer will select a cooperative by 0.20 and 0.26. This indicates that many cooperative members
value tnonetary characteristlcs over non-monetary characteristics.
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Milk marketing cooperatives provide mssny
services for their members. These may include
extensive on-farm field services, milk hauling,
supply balancing, and providing an assured market
for their member’s milk. For some of these
services, such as supply balancing, the cooperative
members pay for the service while the independent
dairy farmers may not. The value of belonging to
a milk marketing cooperative has been estimated by
Berry, et al, and Liebrand and Ling. Berry et al,
found that the maximum difference between
cooperative and non-cooperative milk handler prices
without cooperatives losing members was about
$0.20 per cwt. Liebrand and Ling found that
farmers, who were satisfied or very satisfied with
their cooperative and were receiving lower prices
and knew it, were receiving about $0.57 per cwt
less than non-cooperative members (p. I),
A national survey of mdk marketers
reported that security and market access were
important attributes of cooperatives in that 95
percent of the cooperatives guaranteed a market for
dairy farmers versus 51 percent of the proprietary
processors (Schrader, et al). Wilkins and Stafford
found that the most important tlctors that dairy
farmers indicated for selling milk to cooperatives or
proprietary handlers were price received, hauling
charges, deductions, assessments, and market
amurance. Hamlett and Roach found that an
assured market was the primary reason for joining
a coopemtlve (p, 1). Boynton and Babb found that
a guat%dnteed market and payment for milk were the
most imporkdnt functions to farmers selling to a
cooperative (p, 9). However, no one has quantified
these factors according to their impact, on the
probability of a farmer selecting a cooperative or
non-cooperative milk handler.
The objective of this paper is to quantify
~hequalitative factors according to their impact on
a dairy farmer’s selection of a cooperative or non-
cooperative milk handler, Following Lee, a
structural probit model is estimated to determine the
change in the probability of selecting a handler
based on the farmer’s reasons for selecting their
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current milk handler. The Fdrmer’sreasons include
(a) pays highest price, (b) services are better, (c)
friendly people, (d) other tlrmers recommend, (e)
lowest deductions, and (f) an assured market,
The Model
A dai~ farmer can bccomc a member of a
dairy cooperative or remain an independent and sell
directly to a processing or manufacturing plant.
Each dairy farmer faces two milk prices, the
cooperative price and the non-cooperative price.
The choice of cooperative membership may not be
without cost. For example, the mail box price may
be lower if the farmer joins a cooperative; however,
the farmer is assured or a market for his milk, while
there is not an assured market for the milk of many
non-cooperative members. With these and other
factors, the individual farmer decides to become a
cooperative member or not, With cooperative or
non-cooperative status determined, the farmers’
prices from selling milk are set according to the
type of cooperative joined or proprietary handler
chosen,
Following Lee, let P,, and P,,, be the
cooperative and non-cooperative milk prices for
individual farmer i and p, the reservation price
which summarizes his specific preferences.
Individual farmer i is assumed to join the
cooperative if the cooperative-non-coopemtive price
differential exceeds his reservation price, i.e.,
(1) (P,, - Pn,yP,,,> p,
The reservation price, p,, can be either positive or
negative. In this article, it is mumed that p, is a
function of the farm characteristics, the farmer’s
reasons for choosing their current mdk handler, and
the location of the farm, i.e.,
(2) p, = u,] + al k,
+ct2r, +a31, +8,
where k, is a vector of farm characteristics, r, is a
vector of the farmer’s reasons for choosing their
current milk handler, 1,is a vector of farm locations,
and q is the error reflecting unobservable random
factors which is normally distributed with zero
mean and variance o:. Thus, the individual farmer
i joins the cooperative if
(3) (Pc,- PJ/P,,, > L-x,, + a, k,
+ct2i”, +a31, +&, .
By subtracting the left hand side of eqwation (3)
from both sides of the inequality, this criterion rmy
be written in the form of a probit model. If I: >0,
Parmer i is in the coopcrativc, otherwise not, where
(4) I:=a,, +alk, +a2r,
+ CL3 1,- U4((PC,- P“)/P,,,) + .5,.
The respective prices for cooperative members and
non-cooperative members are
where Cc,and eH,are random residuals which are
assumed to be N(O,IS:)and iV(O,~~), respectively.
Data
A survey of southern dairy farmers was
conducted in January and February of 1989 to
evahmte dairy farmer opinions of their buyers
(cooperatives and proprietary firms) and to
determine reasons for changing or not changing
buyers. Agricultural economists from twelve
southern states, the Economic Research Service and
the Agricultural Cooperative Service participated in
the study (Carley, et al.). Data were obtained from
a rdndom sample of dairy fhrmers in APdbama,
Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Mississippi, North Carolini, South Carolina,
Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia. The questionnaire
was mailed to 5,660 dairy farmers in these states.
Useable responses were obtained from 2,536 dairy
Pirmers for a return rate of 44.8 percent. This
represents approximately 25 percent of the total
Grade A farmers in the twelve southern states.
From the sample, 1,438 useable questionnaires were
obtained from eleven states excluding Florida’,
The mail box price data are based on prices
received by farmers during December 1988, The
mail box price N defined as the gross price paid by
handlers to farmers minus the cost of hauling milk
from the farm to a plant, minus the national dairy
board assessment, minus a state milk commissionJ Agn and Apphed Econ , December, 1994 445
fee, minus market service costs, minus cooperative
capital retains, and minus miscellaneous deductions.
Inforrndtion on the milk price received by
dairy farmers, farm characteristics (k), the farmer’s
reasons for choosing their current milk handler (r),
and the location of the dairy farm (1)were collected
in the survey (Table 1). The farmer’s reasons for
choosing their current milk handler were obrdined
by asking “Why did you choose to sell your milk
through your current cooperative or milk plant?”.
Farmers were asked to circle the applicable reasons
for choosing their current milk handler.
Of the 1,438 farmers in this study, the most
frequently mentioned reasons for choosing a mdk
handler are (1) assured rndrkct and payment (57.6
percent), (2) services are better (36.6 percent), and
(3) pays highest price (36,0 percent)(Table 1), Of
the 1438 farmers, 1,169 were cooperative members
and 269 were not cooperative members.
Cooperative members most frequently mentioned
reasons are (1) assured market and payment (63.9
percent), (2) services are better (39.9 percent), (3)
friendly people (29.2 percent), and (4) pays highest
price (28.9 percent)(Table 1). Non-cooperative
farmers most frequently mentioned reasons for
choosing to sell directly to a processor arc (1) pays
highest price (66.9 percent), (2) friendly people
(37.9 percent), and (3) assured markel and payment
(30.5 percent)(Table 1).
Model Estimation
The dependent variable in the price
equation (equation (5)) is the natural logarithm of
the price to farmers and Log P,, - Log Pn,was used
to approximate ((PC,- PnJ/P,l,)in equation (4) (Lee,
p, 418), The model can be rewritten as
I~=yo+ylk, +y2r, +y31,
- y4(log p,, - log p.,) + e,
In this model, onc observes the exogenous
variables, the cooperative status variable l:, and
either the dependent variable P,, or P.,. The
observed price depends on the farmer’s status, i.e.,
one observes P,, when 1: = 1, and Pnl when 1: = O,
but never both. Note that the price equations in (6)
cannot in general be consistently estimated by
ordinary least squares using the observed prices due
to selectivity bias (Lee). Substituting the price
equations from equation (6) (i.e., equations
representing Log P,, and Log P.,) into the
cooperative status equation l; in (6), one has a
typical probit model
where k, is a vector of farm characteristics, r, is a
vector of the farmer’s reasons for choosing their
current nulk handler, 1,is a vector of fttrm locations
(Table 1), Thus one can estimate the 0’s by probit
analysis and obtain consistent estimates after
normalizing C&=1 (Lee; MaddaPd).
To correct for selectivity btids, the price
equations in (6) can be written M
(8) log PC,= 8,(,+ i5c1 kc,
+ 5,31,, - Q:f(vl)if’iv,)) + ml
(9) log P,,,= ~,,o + L k,,,
+ ijn, 1,,, + CT”e*(j(y/,)/( 1-F’(!y,)))+ Tl,,,
where v =0,, +t3, k,+02r, +021, ,Fis the
cumulative distribution of a standard normal random
variable and ,f is its density function, The
parameters of the price eqwdtions can be estimated
consistently by regressing the observed farmer
prices (Log P’s) on the k’s, l’s and ;j7For.fl(l-fl as
specified by equations (8) and (9) (Lee; Maddala).
(6) log Pc,= i3co + S,l kc,+ S,2 1,,+ e,,
To obtain the structural parameters y of
log P“,= 6.,, + ~tilk,,,+ dH21., + e., the cooperative status equation ~ in equation (6),
predicted values for Log Pc, and Log Pnl for all
observations were used in re-estimating the
where e, - N(O,o,), e,, cooperative status equation ~ in (6) (Maddala, p.
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Table 1. Variable definitions and sample statistics
NAME DfWfNITTON COOPERATE NoNCOOPERATIVE
MAILBOXPRfCE Gross pay price at 3..5%butterfat
minus haubng cost, market setice
costs government assessments,
cooperate deductmts ($ per CWT)
FARM CHAR4CTERfSfTCS (k)
# cows Number of cows milkmg
YRS DAfRY FARMER Number of yean as a dany fanner
‘%INCOME DAfRY Percent of farm sales from dau’y
enterprise
mum Current value of farm operation
minus debt as a percent of current
value
BARG COOP =1 if mdk cooperative that only
bargains =Ootherwtse
BARGPRO Mdk coopcratwc that bargains and
pmccsses mdk (base for conqxmson)
CLASS 1 UTfL Percentage of mdk used for Class 1
DEDUCTTONS Haubng, National Daiq Board,
State Milk Commmwon, Marketing
setwce cost, Capital retains, Other
($s pcr CWf)
OVER-ORDER PREM Dollars above the Federal Marketing
Order Class 1 muumum price
(Ss per CWf)
FARMER’S REASONS (r)
PAYS HIGHfZSI PRfCfZ =1 If handler pa~ the h@est price
=Ootherwtsc
SERVICES BF?fTf3R =1 !f handler pmwdes better sewices
=Ootherwwe
FRD3NDLY PEOPLE =1 [f handler bas friendly personnel
=Oothetwme
FARMERS RECOMMENO =1 !f farmem recommended handler
=Oothermse
LOW~ DEDUCIIONS =1 If handler has lowest deductmns
=0 othemmc
ASSURED MKT/PAYMEfW .1 If handler pmtided assured market
paymen~ =Ootbemnse
FARM LOCATION (1)




GA =1 If Georg!a
=Oothewnse





























M, MS, TX Loui.wana,Misswapp!, Texas 135,87, 120
(Base for comparison)
NC =1 IfNorth Carohna 127
=0 othermse
Sc =1 if South Carolina 52
=Ootherwme
TN =1 if Tennessee 91
=Ootherwme































Results milk marketing cooperative (regime one) and dairy
farmers who were not (regime two) during the
Two-stage parameter estimates and related survey period (Table 2).
statistics for the above model arc presented in
Tables 2 through 3, The consistent two-s~age The results show that the selectivity bias
estimates for the rndil-box price equations (estimated coefficient of (-/(v,)/F(yJ,)) in equation
(equations (8) and (9)) are obtained by dividing the (8)) between the participation equation (equation
sample into dairy farmers who were members of a (7)) and mad-box price equation for cooperativeJ Agr and Appked Econ,, December, 1994 447




































ADJU.Yf’ED R’ 0s64 0.453
F(14, 11S4),F(12,2S6) 109.042” 19.470-
“Change m the dollar price for one umt change m the variable.
Wmrcctedstand ardenm’sare mparentbeses below tbeparameter w.tlmat~. A double (singfe) asterisk indicates significantly
different from zematthe a=.05(.10) siKnlticancelevel. Standafi e~mwere cOmected~ingthe ~timatOm in Maddala@. .,-
2S2-2S6)
dairy farmers (equation (8)) is insignificant at u=. 10
(Lambda in Table 2), However, the selection bias
(estimated coefficient of ~~)/(1-F’(~))) in equation
(9)) between the participation equation (equation
(7)) and mail-box price equation for non-cooperative
dairy farmers (equation (9)) is significant at u = .10
level (Lambda in Table 2), which indicates the
correction for it was necessary.
The coefficient estimate of the cow
numbers variable for cooperative members (Table 2)
indicates that larger operations tend to receive a
higher price from their milk than smaller operators.
This is not the case with a non-cooperative farmer
(Table 2). In addition, results show that the net
prices from bargaining cooperatives arc higher than
the prices from a cooperative that also processes
milk (the omitted variable). The mail box prices
increase as expected as Class 1utilization increases;
however, Class 1 utilization is not significant in the
cooperative equation, Furthermore, as deductions
increase, mailbox price also increases. This
indicates that higher deductions are associated with
higher prices, This was not the case for
noncooperative members although the coefficient is
insignificant, Finally, the over-order premium
coefficient is positive but insignificant.
The results also show, that the prices to
dairy farmers are different from state to state.
Prices to dairy Farmers in Arkansas, Kentucky and
Tennessee are lower than the prices to dairy farmers
in Louisiana, Mississippi and Texas. Alabama,
Georgia, North Carolirm, and Virginia have prices
that are not significantly different from Louisiana,
Mississippi, and Texas. Only South Carolina has
mail box prices that are higher than Louisiana,448 Kilmer, Lee and Carle~, Factors ln~uencwg Farmers’ Selectton of a Milk Handler
Table 3. Milk cooperativestatus equationestimates(structuralform) and marginaleffects
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Frequencies of actual & predicted outcomes
Predicted
Actual TOTAL O 1
TOTAL 143J3 228 1210
0 269 202 67
1 1169 26 1143
‘Change m the probahdlty of switching to a ccmperatwe for one umt change in the wanable. For the binary variables, a dmcrete
change Mdetemrined at the mean values of the variables.
%tandard ermm am in parentheses below the parameter estimates, A double (sinele) asterisk ind,cates smnificantlv d,fferent -, -.
from zeru at the a= 0.0; (0.10) sqgafirance Iev;l.
Mississippi, and Texas, These results are the same
for both cooperative and noncooperative members,
The second column of Table 3 shows the
probit structural estimates for the decision equation
I: (equation (6)). In general, the signs of the
coefficient estimates are consistent with
expectations, In addition, all but three coefficients
are statistically significant.
Of the four farm characteristics, three are
significant at the rx= 0.05 level and one at the a =
0.10 level, As the number of cows increase and as
equity increases, the likelihood of the farmer
becoming a cooperative member decreases (Table
3), The likelihood of the farmer becoming a
cooperative member increases as the number of
years the farmer has been in dairy increases and as
the percent of income from dairy increases (Table
3).J Agr and Apphed Econ,, Decembec 1994
Of the six vanablcs representing a dairy
farmer’s reasons for choosing their current milk
handler, five are significant at the a =0,05 level.
Reasons concerning pays highest price, friendly
people, and lowest deductions decreme the
probability that farmers will choose to join a
cooperative by 0.39, 0,08, and 0.32 (Table 3).
Variables that represent monetary att]tudes (i.e.,
pays highest price and lowest deductions) about a
milk handler have the greatest impact on reducing
the probability of a farmer choosing a cooperative
milk handler.
Factors that positively influence a farmer’s
decision to join a cooperative include services are
better and an assured market and payment for the
farmer’s milk. These factors increased the farmer’s
probability of choosing a cooperative by 0.20 and
0.26. Thus, monetary variables (pays highest price
and lowest deductions) have a larger impact on the
probability of joining a cooperative than non-
monetary variables (services are better and an
assured market and payment).
Of the farm location variables, the
probability of being m a cooperative was less likely
if a farmer lives in Alabama and Arkansas rather
than Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas, The
probability is more likely if a farmer lives in
Kentucky, North Carolina, South Carolina, and
Virginia rather than Louisiana, Mississippi, and
Texas. Farmers are equally likely of being in a
cooperative if they live in Georgia and Tennessee as
well as Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas,
Finally, if the cooperative-non-cooperative
price differential (Log P,, - Log Pn,) is positive
(negative), the probability of a farmer selecting a
cooperative increases (decreases) because the
estimated coefficient is positive (92,622)(Table 3).
The cooperative-non-cooperative price differential
has a sample average that is negative (-0.039 with
a standard deviation of 0.024) which indicates that
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the non-cooperative average price is higher than the
coopemtive average price. Thus on average, the
cooperative-non-cciopemtive price differential will
decrease the probability for farmers to become
cooperative members. Furthermore, a small change
m the negative average price differential will cause
a large change in the probability of selecting a milk
hdndler (Table 3),
Summary and Conclusions
It is generally held that an assured market
is the primary reason that dairy farmers switch to a
milk marketing cooperative (Hamlett and Roach and
F30yntonand 13abb). Of the 1,438 farmers in this
study, the most frequently mentioned reasons for
choosing a milk handler are (1) assured market and
payment (57.6 percent), (2) services are better (36.6
percent), and (3) pays highest price (36.0 percent).
However, the monetary characteristics of a milk
handler (e.g., pays highest price and lowest
deductions) are more important in influencing
Parmers to choose a cooperative milk handler than
are the non-monetaty characteristics (e.g., services
are better and assured market and payment).
Cooperatives arc thought to have lower pnccs and
higher deductions than independent milk handlers
and these factors reduce the probability that a
farmer will select a cooperative by 0.39 and 0.32.
On the other hand, cooperatives are thought to have
better services and an assured market and payment
than mdepcndent milk handlers and these factors
increase the probability that a farmer will select a
cooperative by 0.20 and 0.26.
CooperMives must be concerned with milk
price and deductions in order to attract and keep
members. Services and an assured market and
payment can offset low price to a certain extent;
however, dollars pay the costs of operating a dairy
farm. In order to compete in the market place,
cooperatives must maintain a competitive price
because monetary factors are more important to
dairy farmers thdn non-monetary factors.
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Endnote
1. Data on milk prices received by producers, premiums, and deductions were not obtained from Florida
producers.